CHAPTER 10 THE OLD-TIME JOURNALISTIC METHODS DON'T WORK HERE Some of the old newspaper traditions, of course, we maintain. Our self-righteousness, I can assure you, is undiminished. Our capacity to criticize everybody and our imperviousness to criticism ourselves, are still, I believe, unmatched by novelists, poets or anybody else. -- James Reston, Columbia Journalism Review, 1966 More is not always better. We're moving into an era when the less we use, the better off we will be. Is a 400-pound wife better than a 130-pound wife? (Ted Turner, Principal owner of CNN, in "Notable Quotables" from MediaWatch, June 22, 1992 (Vol. Five; No. 13. p. 2) Faulty journalistic practices that arise because of the scientific nature of the material are another reason why the media disseminates wrong information on population, environment, and other topics. This chapter discusses the nature of these ways of journalistic thinking - which seem to be getting worse as journalists turn from the traditional topics such as war and politics to scientifically-based questions. Nelson Bunker Hunt explained the demise of his huge Texas oil fortune as follows: "I thought that we were going to have a colossal inflation. You had government agencies saying the price of oil was going to $75 a barrel." Someday, newspapers and journalists may be sued for malpractice by the likes of Hunt. Droll lawyers may file suit about the CAFE mileage standards on behalf of the auto makers, and on behalf of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas for the billions they spent on re-design for $3 a gallon airplane gas. The legal theory will be: Premise one, if the press had not played up the 1970s "energy crisis" and the government forecasts as it did, the public would not have been misled about future energy prices. There was an obvious connection between the huge rise in stories in the newspapers and television in the 1970's, and public belief that there was an energy crisis. Indeed, at times this was the most important problem facing the U. S., according to polls. Premise two, if journalists had used acceptable practices for gathering news, they would not have trumpeted forecasts such as the $75 barrel of oil. Suits will follow from the timber industry, advocates for the homeless, and a myriad of other outfits that will claim they were harmed by erroneous journalistic reports of economic and social change. Deans of schools of journalism might be made co-defendants for recklessly failing to teach their students the best -- or even conventional and well-known -- practices for gathering information about such events as natural resource scarcity, and also for not teaching that crucial instrument of thought called inferential statistics. At present, they teach nothing but the standard reportorial methods of interview, and of adversarial threshing of the facts. These methods serve well for covering fires and politics, but fail badly on other stories modern reporters cover. Consider this typical example from The Washington Post: Last month, an Atlanta newspaper columnist named Lewis Grizzard came here for a visit. He wishes he hadn't. Reason: our wondrous, knowledgeable, kind, efficient taxi drivers. Grizzard took four taxi rides during this stay. The first driver took him to Union Station when he had asked to go to National Airport. The second charged Grizzard $10 to drive around in search of a restaurant that they never found. The third ran up $11 looking for the Key Bridge Marriott -- having started all of 200 yards away, in Georgetown. The fourth couldn't locate a rather well-known local landmark, the U. S. Capitol. When Grizzard got home, he wrote a column that was more like a fragmentation grenade. Conclusion: Washington is the worst taxi city in the country. ...So I thought I would go to Atlanta for a day, take as many cabs as I could between my flight in and my flight out, and see whether Grizzard's home town cabs were worse than ours. It wasn't even close. [The author goes on to describe nothing but good experiences in Atlanta.] Ladies and gentlemen, the loser, and still champion: Washington, D.C. (Bob Levey, The Washington Post, Feb 16, 1987, p. C17) This story relates to restricting the number of taxi licenses in Washington, a move that would have major consequences for the public. Now compare this from The American Spectator: Anyone who has ever taken a cab from the Atlanta airport will be exceedingly reluctant to do so again. For years, it has been unusual to find a cab driver at Hartsfield [Atlanta] who could speak English, make change, or find his way around town. And the cabs themselves were, if anything, worse than the drivers. (Geoffrey Norman, "The Hustle and Hypocrisy of Andrew Young's Atlanta", The American Spectator, June, 1988, p. 24) A journalist who takes a few rides in each city cannot possibly reach a valid conclusion about whether taxi service is worse in Washington, D. C. than in Atlanta. These stories are interesting, but they are dangerous. True, investigation of every question should begin with first-hand observation -- actually looking inside the horse's mouth to check out the dental situation. But the investigation should not end with first-hand investigation in many cases. A valid judgment requires a representative sample of rides by a representative sample of customers, a sample large enough to allow for the considerable variability from ride to ride. Especially dangerous to truth is the practice of getting a few bad rides by chance, and then generalizing to taxi service as a whole. Scientific discipline, and the sampling techniques that are part of it, must be brought to bear. But that discipline is not part of a reporter's armamentarium. The representative sample need not be huge or technically fancy. A show of hands in a college class of 200 students in each city, asked whether their most recent cab rides were bad, provides an acceptable estimate of the proportion of bad rides in a city. The resulting comparison would be valid whereas the journalists' method would not. The key to avoiding bad inferential practices is knowing when the special discipline and techniques of science are necessary. The reporter should know that scientific sampling is necessary to get a valid answer about comparative taxi service, and interviewing will not suffice in that case, though the interview technique is valid for covering a fire. More generally, the journalist must know the characteristics of situations that indicate the need for scientific discipline, or instead indicate that the reportorial method will suffice. The reporter's prayer should be a twist on Marcus Aurelius and Alcoholics Anonymous: Give me the reporter's skill to deal effectively with the situation in which the reportorial method is appropriate, the courage to eschew the method where it is not appropriate, and the wisdom to know which situation is which. Scientific discipline is necessary when the chunk of the world you wish to understand presents a complex, varied, off- again-on-again picture that includes data dispersed over time or geography. Scientific methods are not necessary to describe a simple, tight, immediate, local, cause-and-effect pattern. Estimating mortality in the country as a whole requires scientific census-taking techniques whereas finding out who died in a fire does not. Learning the effects of last week's heat wave on ice-cream sales needs no special methods, whereas establishing whether there has been a rise in the earth's temperature, and whether the summer of 1997 was unusual due to the greenhouse effect, requires statistical techniques not known even to many climatologists. You can see whether there are cockroaches in your kitchen without any special equipment, but determining how many bacteria there are in the water requires a microscope. Or consider whether brushing your teeth horizontally is more effective in reducing gum disease than brushing vertically. The important effects do not occur until months or perhaps years afterwards, and they may also be very variable from person to person. Only a carefully controlled experiment on two samples of subjects chosen randomly from the same population can provide an adequate answer. Theoretical reasoning, and even short-run observation of one or even both groups is almost surely inadequate to provide a valid answer. One simple rule to avoid some atrocious blunders is that a few horror stories do not constitute evidence of a nationwide trend. This rule would save a writer from a front-page Wall Street Journal article asserting that "Abuse of the Elderly By Their Own Children Increases in America" (Feb. 3, 1988). Such stories are often buttressed (as was true in this case) by some statistics that seem impressive but that upon examination do not provide any evidence for the supposed trend. (See the third case in Chapter 00 re trends in African-American dissatisfaction). The article does not contain even a scintilla of evidence for a trend, or even an estimate of the amount of such abuse in the present. Nor would an editor of the slightest evidential sophistication let pass a piece like this even on the back page, and certainly not in column 1, page 1. Once in a while there appears an analysis that applies solid data and analysis to these pseudo-trends, e.g. "Battered-Truth Syndrome: Hyped Stats on Wife Abuse Only Worsen the Problem" (Armin Bfrott, Washington Post, July 31, 1994, C1) and "Debunking the 'Day of Dread' for Women" (Ken Ringle, Jan 31, 1993, A1), But this is no excuse for the worthless stuff to have appeared in the first place - and it is exceedingly rare for the rotten stuff to meet its comeuppance in such a debunking article. (A nice example of the beam and the mote: A wonderful article by columnist Steve Twomey in the Washington Post (July 6, 1995, B1) takes politicians to task for basing pieces of legislation on a few anecdotes heard from constituents. Yet big- time journalists make a living on stories that invariably begin with an anecdote - as did Twomey's own excellent story!) When immediate observation is insufficient, and when experts and libraries do not yield the answers you need, one must turn to scientifically-disciplined research. And when I say "must" I mean that failure to use scientifically-sound methods means fooling yourself into potential difficulty, or fooling others with results that will be fraudulent at best and disastrous at worst. Please note, however, that "scientific" does not mean experimental. Astronomy and population censuses are two important examples of scientific enterprises that do not use experimentation. Experiments have great advantages when they are feasible, but when they are not feasible other methods are usually available. The failure to use scientifically-sound methods is an increasing affliction upon the public as newspapers and television become more important influences upon us, and as we increasingly attend to events outside of our own immediate surroundings where we can check the situation for ourselves. The public is systematically misled about such issues as the extent of welfare abuse by immigrants, the dangers of nuclear plants and nuclear waste, and trends in the availability of natural resources and the cleanliness of our environment, because journalists apply to these issues the same techniques that work well in covering warehouse fires and trials of corrupt politicians. But these non-scientific techniques systematically provide unsound answers to the more global questions. Nowadays newspapers recognize that scientific polling methods are required for useful forecasts about the outcomes of elections; gathering opinion the old way in bars and barber shops is not enough. But in too many other cases, journalists still barge ahead without the necessary scientific techniques. The plain fact is that journalists arrogate to themselves the role of identifying and explaining phenomena that are beyond the powers of the human mind to achieve without the systematic procedures of science. In his autobiography, James (Scotty) Reston described how he came to the point of leaving the New York Times if he was not allowed to go beyond the reporting of facts. "We were, I constantly insisted, telling the reader what happened but not why" (1991, p. 121). To their credit, "The editors conceded that more explanation was necessary as the nation became more involved in world affairs, but feared, with some reason, that this might dilute and even corrupt the news columns with opinion" (p. 124). Reston won his battle with his bosses, and he suggests that that opened the doors to others also doing what one Washington Post columnist William Raspberry calls "spotting trends" (Nov. 4, 1994, p. A25). This then spawns what Washington Post media columnist Richard Harwood calls "The Trend Explosion Industry" (August 1, 1994, p. A21) debunking the trends that others "spot" but using the same techniques - unaided thought. Other commentators speculate that the presence of journalists having graduate degrees rather than high school diplomas, thereby thinking themselves more advanced thinkers than simply reporters of the facts, contributes to this "trend" (which I blushingly admit may rest on factual foundations not much more solid than those I criticize). An acquaintance with scientific discipline would also develop a journalistic nose for unlikely conclusions. The front page of the Washington Post headlines "Blacks' Life Expectancy Drops", and continues: "Some officials attributed part of the problem to economic policies of the Reagan administration" (December 15, 1988). Most people who have had a course in social-scientific research would guess that a drop for two years in such a statistic is just a temporary reversal in the long-run trend. And they would know that such a broad phenomenon does not change direction as a result of a few changes in one presidential administration. There are two possible explanations for the misleading headlines and the unsound theorizing: 1) ignorance, and 2) larceny. In the absence of evidence for fraud, perhaps we should assume that ignorance is the culprit. Yes, it may seem inconsistent that journalists can at the same time be remarkably skeptical of people's motives and so credulous about non-facts and non-trends in social science. But anyone - and there were many, including stories on page one - who can tell the public with a straight face that the rate of wife abuse increases sharply on the day of the Super Bowl game surely has the judgment of a child who believes in Santa Claus. Perhaps the sinning journalists are at the stage of purveyors of snake-oil and similar remedies for such ailments as cancer and diabetes as of 1905. When asked if their "goods" really worked they offered justifications such as that the customers at least got hope for their money. Most of these purveyors surely lacked any knowledge of the type of scientific experiment necessary to validate their remedies; many of the sellers as well as their customers relied on anecdotes of cures, just as journalists rely on anecdotes as "proof" of the existence of the trends they write about. It is natural enough that those unschooled in science should not understand how difficult it is to establish the simplest of facts. Decades of research by hundreds of skilled atmosphere scientists have not been able to establish whether the globe is warming or cooling or just oscillating right now. Despite vast sums spent to collect data on crimes, the current trends in violations still are hard to pin down. How difficult must it be, then, to determine whether or not there is a "backlash" trend in race or gender relations or something similarly complicated. Journalists defend their standard practices on the grounds that they enlist experts to thrash out the scientific questions. The theory is that an adversary process like that of the courts winnows out the truth. Even at its best, however, an adversary process has grave shortcomings in scientific matters. And the adversary process as practiced by journalists is not nearly as good as the process in courts. It is ironic that journalists are often critical of the jury system's ability to deal with technical questions, but they are confident of their own ability to do so. For this to be true, a lone journalist would require more judgment than a panel of twelve jurors, because the jury has major advantages not available to journalists. The journalist must pick his/her own experts. Even with the best will, he/she less resources to do this well than do the two sides in a legal dispute. Picking experts requires expertise, and considerable effort to dig into a new field. The journalist's rolodex method is simply an accumulation of celebrity experts -- a celebrity being a person well known for being well known -- and often the celebrity expert expresses views out of step with, and repugnant to, the celebrity's entire profession. The egregious case of Lester Brown versus the consensus of agricultural economists is a case in point. The journalist has less incentive to pick the best experts than do the sides in a court case who seek to find the most effective advocates for their sides. Indeed, the most effective advocates for the two sides can make a newspaper story seem inconclusive, which no journalist wants. Newsweek headlines "More Bad News for the Planet" (March 28, 1988, p. 63). An expert who maintains that on balance there is more good news for the planet than bad news is hardly welcome at the funeral feast. And there is no check on the journalist picking experts in such fashion that the overall impression left is the one the journalist favors. In court there are rules that apply equally to the two sides' experts, giving equal opportunity to both. But a journalist makes the rules and applies them at the same time, a process that journalists themselves would criticize in any other venue. And the journalist elicits the experts' views with one- on-one interviews, without the bracing effect of cross- examination by other experts. Perhaps most infuriating to the experts themselves, journalists often consider themselves qualified to render summary judgments in matters where there is controversy rather than consensus among the experts. The serene arrogance of such practices will pass without further comment. The heart of the jury system is that the individual jurors have no personal stake in the outcome. But journalists do have a built-in bias -- a bias for the slant that is more newsworthy. This bias must affect the choice of experts, and the choice of what to quote from the experts. So for this reason, too, the combat method for ascertaining truth does not protect journalists from the hazards of writing stories about events that require scientific discipline without exerting that discipline oneself. Was it Hegel who said that the only lesson of history is that we forget all history? One of the few negative general trends in a world where most things are getting better is our greater propensity to disregard history with each successive decade and improvement in communications, along with an increase in the volume of printed material available. For example, the average age of articles cited in scientific research nowadays is less now than it was in earlier times, simply because there are more articles being written by more scientists now. This means that great work of the past gets forgotten sooner in favor of trivial recent work. Perhaps for this reason, and perhaps also because of the occupational focus on "news," journalists often devote much attention to recent changes that may be only blips running against long-run changes. For example, every few years there is a spate of news stories about how the food situation is getting worse, when in fact there is only a temporary reversal. Or a single hot summer is viewed as portending major climatic changes. The charges made here also are made by media critics. The Washington Post ombudsman takes aim at "The clever aside, the smart conclusion, the delicious characterization" 9July 12, 1992, p. C6). Reston does so in the headnote to this chapter. The note that is new here, I believe, is the emphasis on the role of science rather than on chiding malefactors about their character and skills. It is not moral improvement that we should focus on, I believe, but rather structural change to provide proper incentives for accurate journalism in fields that require scientific evidence. One wonders: How can journalists have the confidence to convert their curbstone opinions into authoritative-seeming newspaper stories? One bulwark is their belief that they know more than do others. This is reflected in the lament that the public is "Ignorant, Apathetic and Smug" (Richard Cohen, Washington Post, Feb 2, 1996, p. A19), based on old-chestnut poll results that large percentages of the public do not know the names of various public officials. "The Washington Post recently published a poll that would lead you to believe that America is ... the dumbest nation on earth... They do not take the time to know the names of their U.S. senators... only 24 percent of Americans can name them both... For the nation... it is a calamity". That's as self-serving comment as one can imagine. The journalist's game is politics and the news, so it is not surprising that people who work at other trades don't score well at this one. And more public interest in the subject means more papers sold and more importance attached to columnists. But where is the evidence that time spent reading the newspapers is more valuable to anyone than time spent reading computer manuals or poetry? This is just one more unsupported effusion. Nobel- laureate Herbert Simon writes in his autobiography that he reads no newspaper at all. Columnist Cohen says that "Such blather ignorance ought to be condemned". Sure, and teenagers consider their parents terminally ignorant because they don't know the names of the top-ten hit songs. What forces will make for improvement in the quality of the "news" we read about topics requiring scientific discipline to understand them well? I cannot forecast the causes or course of such improvement; only time will tell. The Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 [check} saved the public from some of snake-oil excesses, and later legislation improved the situation even more, though the movement may now have gone too far. But we cannot expect or hope that legislation will improve the truth level in journalism about social-scientific topics; the solution might be worse than the problem even if it could ever be adopted. And in the absence of legislation, progress will be slow because nothing on the horizon promises to help much. Yes, editors more knowledgeable about social science might help. In-house scientific ombudsmen might help, or a board of outside social- science ombudsmen serving for short periods, perhaps in rotation. It is doubtful that the courts can help; who would sue whom on alleging what harms done? But one or another improvement must eventually come, as it came with adulterated foods and false drugs. A Disclaimer Nothing said here is intended to deny that an important cause of unsound journalism about the environment, resources, and population is due to ordinary run-of-the-mine incompetence, the continuation of which is enabled by the lack of scrutiny and sanctions from outside the press. The press prides itself on being "watchdogs", keeping an eye on such institutions as the police and politicians, and "holding their feet to the fire". But who polices the press watchers? Who is watching the watchdogs? Who is keeping their feet to the fire? No one, because there are no effective institutions to do so. Journalism reviews are mostly toothless in this regard, and do not reach the broad public. Ombudsmen cannot humanly forget who pays their salaries, which side of the bread the butter is on, and few humans are brave enough to bit the hands that feed them. And assuredly newspapers and television channels do not do the policing themselves, except on the rarest of occasions. The corrections column corrects the spelling of people's names and the like; does it ever say that the paper had a story completely wrong? When was the last time you read in the press that someone had been fired for writing an unsound story. And the old-boys' and old-girls' club rules that prohibit newspapers from trumpeting other papers' mistakes enables miscreants from paying for their mistakes and peccadilloes. Once again, the explanation of poor performance is the incentive structure. It therefore is foolish to blame individuals. One must try to think of ways to improve the structure. To point this out is not press-bashing; it is the ordinary economics of management. page 1 /mediabk journ10m/November 5, 1996