APPENDIX A: ARE THERE GROUNDS FOR LIMITING IMMIGRATION? This Appendix goes beyond economic issues into the more general arena of philosophical and political arguments concerning immigration. The Appendix takes up the following question (the answer to which seems self-evident to most persons): Is there any persuasive reason for a country to bar any healthy, law- abiding person from immigrating? Many believe it is in the natural order of things that movement across borders should be limited. But prior to World War I, it was thought uncivilized for nations not to permit free movement, "an improper infringement of personal freedom," according to McNeil (1978, p. xiii); passports did not exist. And other arguments about immigration based on "natural rights" all seem to be inconclusive, in part because the concept of rights does not apply to countries as well as it applies to individuals. Therefore, as with most other policies, we turn to judging the matter by considering its consequences. For many, cultural homogeneity constitutes a reason to limit immigration. Though this is largely a matter of taste, one could investigate the consequences of restrictive policies based on cultural homogeneity for such social issues as economic freedom. But I know of no systematic evidence on the topic, and hence I shall leave it. The consequence most worried about is that immigrants constitute a welfare burden. This worry usually runs contrary to the facts, however (See Chapters 5 and 6), and a variety of policies--many of them already in place--can prevent welfare burden even in most individual cases. Job displacement is another major concern. But a considerable body of recent research (See Chapters 11 and 12) shows that immigrants do not in general have negative consequences on labor markets; rather, the consequences are generally positive. It is true that some particular groups may be injured by a particular group of immigrants. But the issues concerning a negative partial effect in the face of a positive general effect are the same as in the case of trade theory, and hence need not be considered further here. The difficult questions--and therefore the possible justifications for controlling entry--arise with respect to externalities. Some externalities can be internalized by appropriate tax measures--for example the costs of school buildings and roads. But externalities such as schools having so many immigrant children that native children learn more slowly-- an unlikely event, but one which must be considered in principle- -cannot be easily internalized (though a voucher system might go a long way). It should be noted that other natives are not barred from entering a community on such grounds, however. Societies which accept as legitimate that individuals have greater private obligations to those more closely affiliated with them--an effective mechanism for supplying help to those who need it, but one which tends to be suspect by the government in such societies as the Soviet Union, even within the family--might also embody the same kinship principle in governmental actions. But it is likely that while this principle is constructive with respect to personal acts, it is destructive with respect to official action. The most important externality is alteration in the economic and social system. If a large country were to flood a small country with immigrants for the purpose of taking it over democratically and then changing the system, this would threaten natives' property in their means of livelihood, because economic activities depend upon the social-political system. But such a possibility is quite unlikely. Furthermore, making the right to vote contingent upon citizenship, which is awarded only after some passage of time, might safeguard against this possibility. The same device should help ensure that at least the voting populace share basic civic values, a consensus which many writers argue is crucial for the satisfactory functioning of any society. Perhaps having non-voting residents with (at least at first) different values who might influence citizens--"foreign agitators and revolutionaries"--is a possible objection to immigration, but I do not know of any evidence to confirm that this is ever a realistic danger. In short, the negative consequences of any level of immigration which is politically imaginable at present are at most speculative, rather than documented. Therefore, a policy which is both prudent and also consistent with these observations would be to increase immigration quotas in a series of increments of significant size--perhaps half a percent, or one percent, of total population at each step--to check on any unexpected negative consequences, and to determine whether demand for admission even exceeds the supply of places. APPENDIX B: PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD IMMIGRATION Public attitudes toward immigration certainly influence public policy, though the extent of the influence is unclear. Hence this section presents some facts about that public opinion. R. Simon studied the major mass-circulation magazine articles on immigration over the past century, and also the available national U.S. public-opinion polls that included questions about immigration, from the earliest polls in the 1930's through 1980 -- mainly Gallup, Harris, NORC, and Harris surveys. Though the strength of the sentiment has varied, at all times the responses seemed to indicate that Americans were not in favor of more immigration. (See Table B-1) Fairly typical was a 1977 Gallup poll which asked: "Should immigration be kept at its present level, increased or decreased?" Seven percent said "Increased", 37% said "Present level", and 42% said "Decreased", with 14% "No opinion" (R. Simon, 1985, p. 41). And the widespread opinion among Americans that "most immigrants wind up on welfare" (47%, according to a 1986 poll; New York Times, July 14, 1986, p. 1) must be noted again. Harwood interprets poll data as showing that after World War II there occurred "a significant liberalization -- certainly by comparison with the anti-alien restrictionism of the 1920s and 1930s" (1986, p. 202), but increasing restrictionism since then. Public opinion may have been more negative in 1977 and 1982 than in 1965 and 1973, but the differences are not so large as to institute overwhelming proof of a trend, given the vagaries of polling techniques and sample sizes. The positive swing toward the earlier levels in the 1986 poll, conducted just before the Statue of Liberty Centennial, may reflect that event and its hoopla, or may simply indicate sampling variation. The techniques of public opinion polls do not allow meaningful significance testing. --------- Table B-1 --------- Another sort of question leaves a different impression, however. Americans have positive feelings toward the immigrants in their own areas, and towards the immigrants they know personally. The comparison can be seen clearly in a 1978 poll about Vietnamese immigrants. When asked, "Thinking now about the Indochinese refugees, the so-called `boat people'; would you favor or oppose the United States relaxing its immigration policies so that many of these people could come to live in the United States?", 32% were in favor, 57% were opposed, with 11% no opinion. But when asked "Would you, yourself, like to see some of these people come to live in this community or not?" 48% said "yes," 40% said "no," with 13% no opinion. There is an interesting split in thought here, with the greater voiced opposition apparently being based upon abstract belief formed by the mass media, and the greater voiced support coming from personal experience with immigrants (R. Simon, 1985, p. 42). Another indication of lack of consistency in public thinking about immigration is that people look back toward prior waves of immigration with more positive feelings than they have toward the present wave, whenever "present" is, according to R. Simon's study of magazines over the past century. She characterizes American public opionion throughout the century as "The immigrants who came in the past were good folks, but the peole who are coming now are scum". For example, an 1888 article in North American Review - one of the major magazines of the day -- urged curbing immigration because "the population that is coming today is semi-barbarous. They are willing and used to living in filthy crowded conditions", in contrast to immigrants prior to 1860 about whom the author said, "[W]e owe them our greatness as a nation; they gave us brain, bone, and muscle...they were healthy and good" (R. Simon, 1985, p. 66). Sometimes "the past" means only five years previously, as was the case with the early and late waves of Vietnamese in the 1970's. This viewpoint constitutes an out-and-out logical contradiction, in that each wave of "scum" is a later generation's wave of "healthy and good". Cafferty et.al. (1983, p. 12) made a similar observation: At all times the restrictionists have counted among their number some of the best minds and some of the most public-spirited citizens of their respective eras. It is only in historical retrospect that their motives have been suspect. Indeed, the restrictionists were often at great pains to distinguish their arguments for restriction from those of previous generations. The argument today, as in the past, is that immigration until now, or until very recently, has been a good thing for our country, but now it must stop, or be sharply curtailed. The restrictionist, in other words, does not draw the line one hundred, fifty, or even twenty-five years in the past; he draws the line in his own time. However, even though he may be cast in the role of villain by immigration historians, the restrictionist has been honest in speaking about one side of the dilemma, namely, the fear of immigration that lurks in all of us. Governmental policy toward immigration seems to have been more positive than public opinion. This disjunction has existed as far back as records exist, not only in the polls era but also in earlier times, as seen in a survey of magazine articles. The same themes heard now were heard then. For example, in 1890, well-known Congressman Henry Cabot Lodge wrote that "We now have a large population, the ... increase of which is quite sufficient ... Our labor market ... is over-stocked in many places and that means a tendency toward a decline of wages" (R. Simon, p. 66). With respect to illegal immigrants, the following appeared in a 1937 issue of Literary Digest: We have within our gates a vast and rather sinister army of aliens who for reasons of their own, thought it best to avoid the officials posted at our port of entry. We are giving millions of them jobs. We are supporting millions more in charity. (R. Simon, 1985, p. 128) Yet the U. S. did admit immigrants -- fewer than might have been desirable, but more than would seem consistent with public opinion. The fact that public opinion has been, and still is, against immigration in the abstract seems explainable to a considerable extent by what is written in the press and shown on television, in conjunction nowadays with anti-immigration organization. Consider these results from the June, 1986, New York Times/CBS News poll. Forty-nine percent of respondents said that "Most recent immigrants are here illegally". That opinion is starkly contradicted by the facts presented by a blue-ribbon study of the Census Bureau in 1980, and even more so by a study published earlier in 1986 by the National Academy of Science. How else can one explain the mis-informed public than being due to the frequent repetitions in the press and on television of unfounded estimates of illegal immigration rates, and dramatic accounts of the entries of illegal aliens into the U.S.? Also, 47% of the public said in 1986 that "Most new immigrants end up on welfare," though the average immigrant family receives less transfers and services from the government than does the average native family, and pays more in taxes than the average native family (see Chapter 5). Is there any other plausible explanation of the wrong public impression than wrong information being provided by the press? Another interesting finding by the June, 1986, poll is that the proportions who believe that immigration should be decreased among "liberals", "moderates" and "conservatives" are 48%, 45%, and 57%, relatively small differences. The issue of immigration cuts across all political groupings. It is of some interest to consider who is for and who is against immigration. R. Simon finds that persons with more education and income are consistently more positive toward immigration than are persons with less education and income. Also relevant is a 1983 poll of 800 black and 800 Hispanic respondents sponsored by the anti-immigration organization Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR). FAIR's spokesman claimed that "One of the interesting findings is that Hispanic Americans and black Americans feel about the same way as Americans as a whole on the immigration issue (Roger Conner cited by Congressional Research Service, 1984, p. 4). But the Congressional Research Service re-analysed the data and pointed out that the poll did not interview any non-Hispanic whites, and therefore had no basis for such a comparative statement. CRS then went further and searched their computerized poll data base for other surveys that might allow the comparison at issue. They found that "Generally, the other studies show that Hispanics are less likely to favor measures to restrict immigration than non- Hispanics, but more likely to be concerned with the issue "(p. 4). The appropriate conclusion, then, is that Hispanics are not as likely as are Americans at large to be in favor of restricting immigration, contrary to the statement on the subject widely circulated by FAIR. I hazard the following generalizations about those who are against immigration: 1) The labor unions have always been the strongest opposition to immigration. And they have enlisted intellectuals who offer apologias for their position. 2) Many intellectuals who worry about greater labor-market competition for poor persons are against immigration. Consider for example this incomprehensible economic logic from Ray Marshall, a professor of economics who also was Secretary of Labor: "Employers arguing that they will `go out of business' without aliens are really saying that they cannot survive without subsidies. Alien labor willing to work at low wages is a labor subsidy, just as a low interest loan is a capital subsidy." 3) Environmentalists and population-control advocates worry about immigrants increasing the "pressure" upon resources and crowding in nature reserves. 4) Those who, out of a lack of understanding of how a decentralized market economy develops through sponteneous evolution, worry about "chaos" and "loss of government control" oppose immigration. As an example, consider this language from the major force behind the movement for immigration "reform" in the first half of the 1980's, Senator Alan Simpson: "[T]the first duty of a sovereign nation is to control its border" (1986, p. 7), a view that would startle the Founding Fathers of the U.S., I believe. Or from Governor Lamm of Colorado: "Can we have today's immigration, virtually out of control, and still remain `one nation, indivisible'" (1986, p. 1) 5) The most interesting and -- aside from the labor movement -- perhaps most important category of persons who oppose immigration are those for whom immigrants represent persons of difference race and culture. This sentiment need not be race hate or dislike, but can be a taste for maintenance of one's own culture, or for cultural homogeneity. In 1986 Prime Minister Nakasone "said Japan's racial homogeneity has helped it become a more `intelligent society' than the United States, `where there are blacks, Mexicans and Puerto Ricans and the level is still quite low'" (The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 13, 1986, p. 1). The Japanese are extremely loathe to admit "gaijin" (foreigners), even as apparently-desirable a person as an American business executive who was born and educated in Japan, speaks accentless Japanese, and is married to a Japanese; landlords were so reluctant to have such a person in the neighborhood that it was extremely difficult for him and his family to find an apartment. (Fields, 1986) And Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain declared in a television speech that the British fear "being swamped by people of a different culture", and that Great Britain therefore "must hold out the clear prospect of "an end to immigration" (Intercom, May, 1978, p. 3). At least some of this sentiment surely is simple racism, however; there was plenty of evidence of this in the days before the expression of such a sentiment was unacceptable. For example, the intelligence-test movement early in this century fueled the eugenicists who argued that the then-immigrants, largely from Southern and Eastern Europe (many of them Jews), were uneducable and could not be assimilated because "They are morons and imbeciles", as one Doctor of Philosophy put it in a magazine article (R. Simon, p. 74). Another magazine article statement on the subject by an economics professor: According to every test made in recent years...it is evident beyound doubt that the immigrants from Northern and Western Europe are far superior to the ones from Southern and Eastern Europe. The vital thing is to preserve the American race -- build it up with Nordic stock: intelligent, literate, easily assimilated, appreciated and able to carry on our American institutes (R. Simon, p. 75) Or a professor of zoology writing in 1919: "First it was the Negroes, then it was the Chinese and Japanese, now it is the Mexicans. Soon it will be the Filipinos" who "bred like flies" and who carried disease (R. Simon, p. 76). In other countries where there is less of a taboo on speaking frankly about the matter, one still hears such views nowadays. This statement was issued by a group of German professors in early 1982: It is with grave concern that we observe the infiltration of the German nation by millionfold waves of foreigners and their families, the infiltration of our language, our culture, and our national characteristics by foreign influences . . . Biologically and cybernetically, nations are living systems of a higher order, with different system qualities that are transmitted genetically and by tradition. The integration of large masses of non- German foreigners and the preservation of our nation thus cannot be achieved simultaneously; it will lead to the well-known ethnic catastrophes of multi-cultural societies (Population and Development Review, Vol. 8, No. 3, September, 1982, pp. 636-637). Nowadays in the U. S., it is difficult to determine the motivation for opposition to immigration. What to make of a statement by the governor of Colorado warning that "Ethnic, racial and religious differences can become a wedge; they can grow and eventually splinter a community"? (Lamm, 1986, p. 1) Here are some speculations about those who are in favor of more immigration: 1) Those who wish to bring more of their countrymen from abroad often are in favor. But it should be noted that this impulse often wanes quickly after arrival. As a magazine writer noted in 1914: "Immigrants who came earlier and their descendants have always tried to keep this country for those who were already here and for their kin folk" (quoted by R. Simon, p. 73). 2) "Cosmopolitans" who take an all-world rather than nationalistic view. 3) Those who are moved by the putative "U. S. tradition of immigration". 4) Libertarians, on principle with respect to individual rights. 5) Those who worry about refugees. 6) Economists who recognize benefits to the economy as a whole, though seeing that some sub-groups might be temporarily hurt. 7) Employers of unskilled labor such as fruit growers. Native Hispanics and blacks seem to be ambivalent about immigration. APPENDIX C: VIEWS OF ECONOMISTS AND OTHER SOCIAL SCIENTISTS TOWARD IMMIGRATION Stephen Moore, Rita J. Simon, and Julian L. Simon There is agreement among economists that immigration has had, and has now, a positive effect upon the economic condition of the United States. We surveyed those persons who have been president of the American Economic Association, as well as those who have members of the President's Council of Economic Advisors. In answer to the question "On balance, what effect has twentieth century immigration had on the nation's economic growth?", 81 percent answered "Very favorable" and 19 percent answered "Slightly favorable". (Complete data may be found at the end of this Appendix.) None of these top economists said that immigration was "slightly" or "very unfavorable," or felt that he or she did not know enough to answer. This extraordinary consensus belies the public picture of the economic profession as being on both sides of all important matters. The top economists also are willing to extend their backward assessment into a forward-looking policy judgement. When asked "What level of immigration would have the most favorable impact on the U. S. standard of living?", 56 percent said "more", 33 percent said "same number", and none said "fewer". Only 11 percent said "don't know". It is instructive to compare the views of persons who are not experts in economic affairs. To the latter question about the level of immigration that would be most favorable for the standard of living, a similar high-level panel of other social scientists -- sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, psychologists, and historians -- responded less favorably. Only 31 percent said that more immigrants would be most favorable. It is also startling to find that even though these non-economist social scientists have no expert knowledge of the matter, only 4 percent were unwilling to hazard a judgment and hence said "don't know", an even smaller proportion than the 11 percent among economists. Perhaps the lack of reluctance of such non-experts to express their views on this technical subject outside their fields of special knowledge helps explain why the subject of immigration is as controversial as it is. For further comparison, consider the polls of the general public (discussed in Appendix B) asking a fairly similar question, not about the economic effects of immigration, but the more general "Would you like to see the number of immigrants allowed to enter our country increase, decline, or do you think we are letting in about the right number now?" It cannot be known whether the general public response is mainly based on non- economic or economic factors. But to the extent that economic factors enter in, the reaction of the general public is much more negative, and much less positive, than the assessment of top economists. (How should we interpret other social scientists giving more positive responses to these economic questions than other Americans -- even if less positive than economists? One possibility is that the general pattern of higher education being more associated with a positive view of immigration is being displayed here. Another possibility: World-class tenured professors have relatively little to fear from immigrant job competition. But these are speculations rather than facts.) We also asked economists about the economic effect of illegal immigration: The question was: " What impact does illegal immigration in its current magnitude have on the U.S. economy?" An astonishing 74 percent of the top economists said that "Illegals have a positive impact". Eleven percent said "neutral impact", and 11 percent said "negative impact", with 4 percent "don't know". This is indeed a striking degree of consensus. This consensus view about illegals held by top economists certainly is at variance with the point of view expressed by most columnists, editorial writers, and television commentators. And the consensus view of economists is quite different from the view held by other top social scientists. Fifty one percent of the other social scientists said "negative impact" about the economic effect of illegals, with only 7 percent "don't know"; it is likely that the general public is even more negative toward illegals. One can only wonder what motivates this view of economic effects of illegals on the part of others than economists. And I marvel at the lack of uncertainty indicated by the small proportion of non-economists who do not feel qualified to answer. The discrepancy between the view expressed by the economists and that expressed by the other social scientists and by the lay public fits with a general pattern in which laypersons are more worried by many phenomena than are real experts; nuclear power is a striking example. (See Cohen, _____.) At a meeting of world- class experts on agriculture, minerals, oil, forests, soil erosion, and a variety of related natural resource topics, geographer Fraser Hart observed at the end of the day: "All of us are optimistic about our own subjects, but pessimistic about everyone else's," a clear indication of the negative bias on the part of less-informed persons that pervades discussion of resources and demographic movements. When we asked the non-economist social scientists about the non-economic effects of immigrants, a subject on which they have professional expertise, their judgements are of a different sort. In answer to "What effect has twentieth century immigration into the United States had on the nation's social fabric", 47 percent said "very favorable", 24 percent said "slightly favorable", 13 percent said "slightly unfavorable", and 9 percent said "very unfavorable", with 7 percent "don't know". And in answer to "What effect has twentieth century immigration into the United States had on the nation's culture?" 59 percent said "very favorable", 27 percent said "slightly favorable", 7 percent said "slightly unfavorable", and 2 percent said "very unfavorable", with 5 percent "don't know". These assessments by non-economic social scientists of immigration's non-economic effects are quite positive. And here it would seem that -- even though such terms as "culture" and "social fabric" may well mean very different things to different people -- the social scientists have this expert advice to give to the American public, derived from their scholarly work: Lay aside your worries (and claims) about conflict and social tension outweighing the positive social-cultural effects of immigration. So to sum up: If the best economists understand their subject, immigrants -- including illegal immigrants -- benefit the economy; they find no economic reason to try not to admit more immigrants, or to prevent the entry of the sort of workers that illegals are, or to get rid of them. This directly contradicts the economic arguments that are given by such organizations as FAIR and THE ENVIRONMENTAL FUND which lobby against immigration, as well as the arguments of the labor union and of such legislators as Senator Alan Simpson. But the voices of such well-respected mainstream economists reported by journalists, who tend to rely instead upon politicians and interest-group advocates for their print stories and television interviews. And the views of the top economists are seldom heard in the current Congressional debate on immigration. The Full Poll Results Samples of 27 top economists and 55 top non-economist Social Scientists On balance, what effect has twentieth century immigration had on the nation's economic growth? Other Social Economists Scientists (percents) Very favorable 81 51 Slightly favorable 19 31 Slightly unfavorable -- 2 Very unfavorable -- 2 Don't know -- 14 What level of immigration would have the most favorable impact on the U.S. standard of living? Other Social Economists Scientists (percents) More 56 31 Same Number 33 47 Fewer 0 18 Don't know 11 4 Do you feel that recent immigrants are qualitatively different in economic terms than immigrants in past years? Other Social Economists Scientists (percents) More negative impact 7 16 About the same impact 70 60 More positive impact 4 10 Don't know 19 14 What impact does illegal immigration in its current magnitude have on the U.S. economy? Other Social Economists Scientists (percents) Illegals have a positive impact 74 18 Illegals have a neutral impact 11 24 Illegals have a negative impact 11 51 Don't know 4 7 What effect has twentieth century immigration into the United States had on the nation's social fabric? Other Social Scientists (percents) Very Favorable 47 Slightly favorable 24 Slightly unfavorable 13 Very unfavorable 9 Don't know 7 100 What effect has twentieth century immigration into the United States had on the nation's culture? Other Social Scientists (percents) Very favorable 59 Slightly favorable 27 Slightly unfavorable 7 Very unfavorable 2 Don't know 5 100 Do you feel that recent immigrants are qualitatively different in socio-psychological terms than immigrants in past years? Other Social Scientists Recent immigrants are less likely to assimilate 36 Recent immigrants are about as likely to assimilate 52 Recent immigrants are more likely to assimilate 7 Don't know 5 APPENDIX D: IMMIGRATION, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND NATIONAL SECURITY It is a truism for many people in and out of government that population growth from natural increase and immigration has an unsettling effect resulting in political instability, war, and revolution, especially in poor countries. And positive effects of immigration upon our international relations are seldom referred to. The body of scientific literature on population growth and war is thin. But to the extent that there is systematic analysis, I read the conclusion as being that there is no connection between population growth and war or other political instability due to the struggle for economic resources. The classic inquiry into the causes of war is that of Quincy Wright, and in his short summary in the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences he says: Population pressure, which produces progressive improverishment, has had little influence in producing war unless accompanied by increased knowledge of economic differentials and by inciting propaganda. In sum, studies of both the direct and indirect influence of economic factors on the causation of war indicate that they have been much less important than political ambitions, ideological convictions, technological change, legal claims, irrational psychological complexes, ignorance, and unwillingness to maintain conditions of peace in a changing world. (Wright, 19??, pp. 462-463.) Choucri ( ) concludes that what she calls "demographic" factors sometimes lead to conflict, either violent or non- violent. But her key demographic factor is the relative increase in the size of one ethnic group relative to another, rather than absolute increase in population size or population density. The importance of this distinction can be seen most clearly by listing the wars that she considers "archetypical cases" of "population dynamics and local conflict": These are: the Algerian War of Independence, 1954-62; the Nigerian civil war; the two wars involving Indonesia; the conflict in Ceylon; El Salvador-Honduras; and the Arab-Insraeli series of wars (page 135). In my view, none of these are conflicts undertaken to obtain additional land or mineral resources in order to increase the standard of living of the group initiating the conflict. To show that population growth causes conflict, one would need to show that two neighboring countries or groups, both of whom are growing rapidly, are more likely to come into conflict than two neighboring countries or groups neither of whom are growing rapidly. This Choucri has not been shown. As Choucri views the matter, conflict could as easily be caused by one country or group reducing its growth rate relative to another country or group, as by one increasing its relative growth rate. And in fact many writers have argued that this was the case with France and Germany -- that because France's birth rate was so low it induced the French-German wars. Now in the 1980's, Wattenberg (forthcoming) argues that the low U. S. birth rate constitutes a danger vis a vis the Soviet Union. Immigration may also affect our peacetime relationships with other countries and peoples. Hardin and The Environmental Fund offer the ingenious argument that it is really idealistic of the U.S. to keep out immigrants, because doing so allows the U.S. to keep itself strong and therefore able to help the rest of the world; if the U.S. were economically weak, they say, the rest of the world would not have the benefit of its technological contributions. But as long as the U.S. recognizes that admitting the immigrants makes it stronger rather than weaker, scientifically as well as economically (and, of course, militarily), this argument--though it is not ethically inconsistent--is seen to be empty. Permit me to repeat that there is no ethical dilemma. The U.S. does not need to balance the gains to others against the sacrifice to itself. Because the U.S. does good for itself at the same time that it does good for immigrants, on balance, we do not need to consider the ethical basis of simply drawing a boundary line around the nation and saying that only those who are lucky enough to be born within the line are entitled to chances that are denied to others for selfish reasons. Going beyond the economic mechanisms described earlier in the book, immigrants (and their children) can help U.S. export campaigns by speaking foreign buyers' languages and by sharing their cultures. The U.S. worries enough about languages that the federal government funds programs to teach native Americans foreign languages for this purpose. One does not require a careful evaluation and an explicit cost/benefit analysis to see how inferior is the latter device compared to admitting immigrants. Consider the following news story: Guzow, Poland--In the staff dining room of the Guzow Vegetable Experiment Station, Marian Dobrowolski watches, expressionless, as the waitress crosses the bare tiles and sets before him a platter of french- fried potatoes. . . This is the most important moment in the entire crisis- ridden history of the McDonald's Polish potato project. McDonald's Corp. wants to grow potatoes here; it wants to serve them in its restaurants in Western Europe. The Poles want to grow them. But can they accept the immutable world-wide anti-deviationist standards of the golden french fry? Can McDonald's impose its system on Poland? That is what Mr. Dobrowolski has come to find out. He was born in Poland 66 years ago. But since 1956 he has lived in the U.S., and for l8 years his office has been on Ronald Lane in Oak Brook, Ill. He is the man from McDonald's (Wall Street Journal, October 9, 1986, p. 1). Another illustration is found in an article titled: "Brazil's Japanese Population Thrives, Helps Tokyo Forge Ties With Brasilia." The article goes on to tell about a "growing community of 800,000 Brazilians of Japanese descent, the largest collection of ethnic Japanese outside Japan. They include farmers, bankers, bureaucrats, engineers and politicians. And they are an important link in ripening financial ties between Brazil and Japan, two of the world's fastest growing economies." "The Japanese are more cooperative with Brazil in investing and financing than traditional industrial countries. They are very aggressive in international trade. Maybe you could say we have a special relationship," says Ernane Galveas, Brazil's finance minister (Wall Street Journal, September 24, 1982, p. 25). The personal tie that builds up between countries when there is immigration from one country to the other, even across gulfs of ideology and conflict, is also a political benefit, of course. The Polish-U.S. and Greek-U.S. connections are prime examples. Think how useful it would be to increase such felt connections with China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, and other countries. There is also something of a hostage effect here. (Was it Swift who suggested that a good way to prevent war would be to have the children of the national leaders of hostile countries living in the capital cities of their opponents? Having the adult children study in the opposite-number countries could be a practical step of that sort today. Immigrants can serve a similar purpose.) 86-88APP Immappen 1/4/88 Year Poll Question 1953 NORC In general, do you think the Not Enough About the Too Many Don't Know United States is letting too Right Number many immigrants come into 13 37 39 11 this country or not enough? 1965 Gallup Should immigration be kept at Increased Present Level Decreased Don't Know its present level, increased or decreased? 8 39 33 20 1977 AIPO Should immigration be kept at Increased Present Level Decreased No opinion its present level, increased or decreased? 7 37 42 14 1982 Roper In recent years, there has Increased Right Number Decreased Don't Know been a lot of discussion about Now the number of immigrants allowed into our country. On the whole, 4 23 66 7 would you say that you would like to see the number of immi- grants allowed to enter our country increased, or would like to see the number decreased, or do you think we are letting in about the right number now? 1986 NYTimes/ Exact text not given. Increased Kept at Decreased Don't Know CBS News Current Level or No Answer 7 35 49 9 Table B-1 Public Opinion Concerning the Volume of Immigration 86-88APP Immappen 11/15/86